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COMMENTARIES

MONROE LEIGH*

Sabbatino's Silver Anniversary and the

Restatement: No Cause for Celebration
Restaters of the law, like lexicographers, encyclopedists, and others who
undertake monumental works of scholarship, must be prepared to accept the
slings and arrows of colleagues who single out small portions of their vast
enterprise for critical attention. It is hoped that the Reporters who produced the
revised Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third)'
will accept what follows with the same cheerfulness as Doctor Johnson who,
when asked by a lady why he had defined "pastern" as "the knee of a horse,"
responded, "Ignorance, Madame, pure ignorance."
The revision of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States was an impressive undertaking, presenting as it did the opportunity to
clarify the foreign relations law in several confused and troublesome areas.
Probably no issue is in more need of coherent analysis than the act of state
doctrine, which when applied precludes U.S. courts from questioning the legal
effect of certain public acts of foreign states, even when those acts violate
international law. Unfortunately, the act of state doctrine as restated by the
American Law Institute (ALl) has language so broad and a scope so sweeping
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1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter
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that it suggests a paraphrase of that famous commentary on the charge of the
Light Brigade.2 It is magnificent, but it is not law.
In this author's view, the Restatement (Third) is not the law on act of state. It
not only fails properly to define and limit the act of state doctrine, but also
unjustifiably expands the doctrine. 3 This approach is all the more regrettable
since the act of state doctrine has been a source of great controversy and
uncertainty in the twenty-five years since the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in
Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino.4 This judicially created doctrine has been
applied (and too often misapplied) in dozens of cases and has been the source of
much scholarly debate. 5

2. General Pierre Francois Joseph Bosquet, on the charge of the light brigade at Balaklava,
October 25, 1854: "C'est magnifique, mais c'est ne pas la guerre."
3. It is not unusual for Advisers to a Restatement of the Law to author criticisms of the
Reporter's final text as approved by the American Law Institute. For example, Judge Charles Clark,
formerly Dean of the Yale Law School, published in 1943 a rigorously critical article dissenting from
the Restatement of Property, for which he had served as an adviser. Clark, The American Law
Institute's Law of Real Covenants, 52 YALE L.J. 699 (1943). Another Adviser, Professor Sims, was
no less rigorous in his criticisms. Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement
of the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1944). The present author finds
himself in a similar position with respect to the treatment of the act of state doctrine in the
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations. While critical of the text dealing with the act
of state doctrine and related subjects, this author would first wish to pay wholehearted tribute to the
labors of the Chief Reporter and his staff on the completion of a monumental work of great scholarly
and practical significance.
4. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabbatino an agent of the Cuban Government asked a U.S. district
court to award it proceeds from a sale of sugar that had been expropriated from U.S. interests in
Cuba. The agent asserted that the act of state doctrine barred adjudicating validity of the
expropriation under international law. In Sabbatino the Supreme Court was called upon to choose
between two lines of precedent, one of great antiquity and the second of considerable antiquity. The
first line of precedents begins with W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (15th ed. 1809), which declared
that international law was part of "our law," and was reinforced by Justice Marshall in The Nereide,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815), and Justice Gray in the Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900), in which international law was declared to be incorporated in the municipal law of the United
States. The second line of cases begins with Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)
(Chief Justice Fuller: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign States, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory.") and continues through Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (again Chief Justice Fuller: "To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign
State to be re-examined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly
'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.' ") to the
Sabbatino case itself. In the court of first instance in Sabbatino Judge Dimock had held that the act
of state doctrine was subject to an international law exception. The Supreme Court, at the urging of
the State and Justice Departments, reversed this judgment and held, inter alia, that U.S. courts may
not examine the validity of a taking by a foreign government of property within its own territory in
the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
5. Recent articles discussing the act of state doctrine generally, include: Bazyler, Abolishing the
Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986); Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act
of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68
(1985); Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 599 (1980) [hereinafter Rehabilitation and Exoneration].
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Unfortunately, despite improvements on the early drafts of the Restatement,
the ALI's final text does not accurately reflect the law 6 as set down by the
Supreme Court, particularly in Sabbatino, and as applied by the lower courts.
The Restatement selectively overemphasizes Supreme Court language and lower
court cases that expand the scope of the doctrine and narrow the exceptions to the
rule. The overly broad act of state doctrine presented in the Restatement is
particularly mischievous because it would aggravate the already serious problems caused by the doctrine. These problems include: (a) frustrating the
application of international law and thus hindering its progressive development
by U.S. courts; (b) denying litigants their day in court even when they have
properly invoked the court's jurisdiction; and (c) frustrating the effective
application of other U.S. laws.
I. Restatement Treatment of the Act of State Doctrine
The Restatement (Third) treats the act of state doctrine in two sections. Section
443, entitled, "The Act of State Doctrine: Law of the United States," sets forth
the act of state "rule" as follows:
(1) In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the
validity of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or from sitting
injudgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its
own territory and applicable there.
(2) The doctrine set forth in Subsection (I) is subject to modification by act of
Congress. See § 444.
The Comments to this section, which also carry the approval of the American
Law Institute, discuss the origins and rationale of the doctrine; the scope of the
doctrine; many of the "exceptions" to the rule; the validity of the rule under
international and foreign law; the status of the rule in United States law; and the
form and proof of acts of state. The Reporters' Notes, which do not carry
Institute approval, further develop these and other topics.
Treatment of the second "Hickenlooper Amendment," a subsequent statutory
enactment which-as intended-significantly curtails the Supreme Court ruling
in Sabbatino, is left to the next succeeding section, 444, which reads as follows:
In the absence of a Presidential determination to the contrary, the act of state doctrine
will not be applied in a case involving a claim of title or other right to property, when
6. At this point, a brief note concerning the nature of Restatements is appropriate. As the very
name suggests, Restatements are often expected to be mere recitations of what courts have said in the
past. As Herbert Wechsler, Director of the ALt for over twenty years recognized, however, if we ask
ourselves what courts will do in fact within an area, can we divorce our answers wholly from our
view of what they ought to do, given the factors that appropriately influence their judgments, under
the prevailing view of the judicial function. Wechsler, The Course of Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J.
147, 149 (1969). Thus, while the ALI is clearly not free to write on a clear slate, it should "declare
the rule an enlightened court ... would announce," rather than simply "declare the majority rule."
Id. at 147.
SPRING 1990
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the claim is based on the assertion that a foreign state confiscated the property in
violation of international law.

II. The Restatement: An Inaccurate Reflection of the Law
It is axiomatic to say the purpose of a Restatement is to explicate the law as
the Institute finds it, not to say what the reporters would like it to be. With
respect to the act of state doctrine, the Restatement (Third) wanders far afield
from this standard. Indeed, this part of the Restatement was roundly criticized
within the ALI on these grounds. Professor Myres McDougal, for example, said
"I think this is by far the worst part of the Restatement" and suggested its
deletion "lock, stock and barrel." 7 Space does not permit the examination of
each facet of the doctrine addressed by the Restatement. However, the Restatement's treatment of four particular limitations on the act of state doctrine
demonstrates that the Restatement advocates a view of the doctrine that is more
expansive than that presently practiced in the courts or accepted by most legal
scholars. These limitations are: (1) the limitations which are explicit in Justice
Harlan's formulation of the Sabbatino rule; (2) the Hickenlooper Amendment,
which curtails application of the doctrine; (3) the effect of customary international law and "unambiguous agreements" on the doctrine; and (4) the nature of
acts which invoke the doctrine.
A.

DISREGARD OF THE HARLAN LIMITATIONS

The first major problem with the Restatement's treatment of the act of state
doctrine is that it is not supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Sabbatino.
The Sabbatino holding supports an act of state doctrine which is narrow in scope
and flexible in application. The Restatement, however, enunciates a doctrine
which is broad in scope and general in application. Furthermore, the Restatement
8
relies on concepts and language from the 1897 case of Underhill v. Hernandez
that the Sabbatino Court either declined to endorse or specifically rejected.
The present author has been a critic of the Supreme Court decision in
Sabbatino from the beginning. However, since the Restatement purports to
derive its rule from the rule set forth in Justice Harlan's opinion, it is important
to note what Sabbatino says. Justice Harlan's text is not fully quoted or reflected
in the black letter text of section 443, but it is set forth in Comment b. It is worth
repeating:
[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this
case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other

7. McDougal, Annual Meeting, 62 A.L.I. PRoc. 475 (1985) [hereinafter ALI PRoc.].
8. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
VOL. 24, NO. 1
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unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint
alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
What is significant about this passage is that Harlan specifically said that he was
not laying down an inflexible rule, nor was he laying down an all-encompassing
rule. Of even greater significance is the statement that he was not reaffirming any
previously stated rule, such as the rules laid down in Underhill v. Hernandez and
in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 9 where we find such sweeping and grandiloquent phrases as "sit[ting] in judgment on the acts of [a foreign] government" and "vex[ing] the peace of nations." It is this author's conviction that
these resounding phrases have caused much of the trouble surrounding the
application of the act of state doctrine.
Not only did the Sabbatino Court expressly decline to reaffirm Underhill's
sweeping language, it also criticized Underhill's view of the basis of the act of
state doctrine.
We do not believe that this doctrine is compelled ... by inherent nature of sovereign
authority, as some of the earlier decisions seem to imply, see Underhill; American
Banana Co.; Oetjen. .

...o

In place of an inflexible general rule such as that set forth in Underhill, the
Court in Sabbatino enunciated a pragmatic and flexible standard for deciding
when to apply the act of state doctrine, based on the balancing of several
considerations. The Court stated that the doctrine's "continuing vitality depends
on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial
and political branches"; that "[t]he greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate
it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it"; and that "the balance of
relevant considerations may also be shifted."1 1 Lower courts have widely
followed the principle that the act of state doctrine should not be applied
generally, pursuant to an inflexible rule, holding instead that application is
discretionary 12 and that the doctrine should be applied pragmatically and
14
flexibly,' 3 on a case-by-case basis, balancing different considerations. 15
9. 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).
10. 376 U.S. at 421 (citations omitted).
I. Id. at 427-28.
12. Friedar v. Government of Israel, 614 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
13. Tchacosh v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); New York Land Co. v. Republic of Philippines, 634 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987); Ledgerwood v. State of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1985);
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 77 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985); Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd mem., 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. Airline Pilots Ass'n v. TACA Int'l Airlines, S.A., 748 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984); Northrop
Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983);
SPRING 1990
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Unfortunately, the Restatement fails accurately to restate the law in this
regard. Rather, it states in black letter that "courts .. .will generally refrain
from examining the validity of a taking . . . or from sitting in judgment on other

acts of a governmental character" and neglects the flexibility and balancing
considerations enunciated in Sabbatino and followed by lower courts. Since the
Court in Sabbatino expressly declined to reaffirm or endorse Underhill's
sweeping notion that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another," it is odd in the extreme to find that language
reflected in the black letter of the Restatement.
The Restatement also conflicts with the Sabbatino holding with respect to the
scope of the act of state doctrine. After rejecting a general, inflexible application
of the act of state doctrine and substituting in its place a balancing test, the
Supreme Court also rejected an all-encompassing scope to the act of state
doctrine, and instead applied its balancing test only to the specific area before it,
that of expropriation. Both the nature of the balancing approach and the express
"we decide only" language used by Harlan indicate that the Sabbatino opinion
applied the act of state doctrine only in the area of a taking of property within the
territory of a foreign state. What is striking about the black letter text of the
Restatement is that the act of state doctrine is made to apply not only to
expropriatory acts of foreign governments but also to "other acts of a
governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory and
applicable there." The latter phrase, in this author's opinion, relates back to
earlier cases such as Underhillv. Hernandez, which Justice Harlan rejected in the
Sabbatino opinion.
Thus, with regard both to the application of the doctrine and its scope, the
Restatement's view of the act of state doctrine is closer to the inflexible and
all-encompassing rule that the Court rejected than the flexible and narrowly
focussed holding it adopted. From Sabbatino's "we decide only" to the
Restatement's "courts

. .

.will generally" there is a breathtaking leap which is

not supported by any plausible authority.
B.

STATUTORY EXCEPTION

A second problem is that the Restatement does not accept forthrightly that the
Sabbatino holding has been circumscribed significantly by congressional enactment. In 1967, one of the few prominent scholars "who agreed with the Supreme
Court decision" in Sabbatino wrote (somewhat regretfully) that "Congress
substantially 'repealed' the decision of the Supreme Court by enacting the

Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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'Second Hickenlooper Amendment.' -"16 This scholar, Professor Henkin, later
became the Chief Reporter of the Restatement (Third).1 7 Under Professor
Henkin's guidance, the Restatement, in effect, makes a significant attempt to
limit the Hickenlooper Amendment.
In 1964, disturbed by the Sabbatino decision, Congress reacted quickly by
passing the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act.' 8 This
amendment, designed to "reverse the presumptions" of Sabbatino, directs U.S.
courts not to apply the act of state doctrine to claims arising out of foreign
2°
expropriations that violate international law.1 9 The Second Restatement, and
most commentaries written soon after passage of the amendment, gave the
exception a broad scope. 2 1 For example, on remand in Sabbatino the district
court relied on the amendment to dismiss the complaint.2 2
However, despite the plain meaning of the statute, the legislative history, and
recent cases the Restatement (Third) has incorporated constrictions of the
amendment into section 444. For example, Comments to Restatement section
16. Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175
(1967).
17. Louis Henkin was the Chief Reporter. The Associate Reporters were Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Louis B. Sohn, and Detlev F. Vagts.
18. The legislative history of the amendment is discussed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243
F. Supp. 957, 962-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1968). See also Foreign Assistance Act: Hearings on H.R. 750 Before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
19. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment or the Sabbatino Amendment was made a permanent
part of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1965. The amendment reads in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline
on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title
or other rights to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party
claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other
taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of
international law, including the principles of compensation and the other standards set
out in this subsection: Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable. . .(2)
in any case with respect to which the President determines that application of the act
of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the
court. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
20. According to the Second Restatement, "[tihe bulk of the cases which have recently been
brought, however, appear to fall within this exception." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Title C, Acts of Foreign States: Law of the United States,
introductory note at 124 (1965). The Restatement's assessment, like those of the other early
commentators, was premature.
21. These early assessments include Henkin, supra note 16; Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino
Amendment-International Law Meets Civil Procedure, 59 AM. J.INT'L L. 89 (1965).
22. Farr, 243 F. Supp. at 981. Interestingly, in Sabbatino/Farr no tangible property was before
the court. The actual sugar had never been brought to the United States; only the bills of lading had
been. Thus, unless the Restatement phrase "specific property" applies to a document representing
tangible items, the Restatement version of the Amendment would not even apply to the facts of
Sabbatino, the very case the Hickenlooper Amendment was intended to overturn.
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444 limit the Amendment's scope to the rare instances of claims to specific
property actually before the court.23 The law today concerning the Hickenlooper
Amendment does not require the narrow interpretation that the Restatement
suggests. A more accurate reflection of the law would present a broader view of
the exception's scope.
C.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Restatement (Third) also does not accurately restate the law with regard
to the relationship between customary international law and the act of state
doctrine. The Sabbatino opinion was cautious and narrow in dealing with
customary international law, emphasizing its finding of an ideological dispute as
to principles governing expropriation. The Restatement, however, again takes
unwarranted liberties with the Sabbatino holding, denying effect to international
law in a manner wholly unsupported by the Court's opinion.
In the oft-repeated language, the Sabbatino court said: we decide only that the Judicial
Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property ...in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if
the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law. 24
The plain language of this holding says only that an act of state will prevail over
a claim based on customary international law where: (1) the act is a taking, and
(2) there is no unambiguous agreement as to controlling legal principles. The
limitation to takings is clear, but the condition of absence of agreement regarding
controlling legal principles has been subject to differing interpretations. Taken
out of context, the phrase "other unambiguous agreement" might be ambiguous
itself; it could be interpreted either to mean clearly agreed principles of
customary international law, or to encompass only explicit international agreements such as treaties and executive agreements. Careful reading of the Harlan
opinion, however, substantially dispels this ambiguity. The very next sentence,
after the passage just quoted, begins an extended discussion of the disagreement
among nations as to international law principles governing expropriation. It
would have been pointless-even nonsensical-for the Court immediately to
devote several pages to the dispute over customary international law principles if
it had just held that customary international law would not be applied except
where there was a treaty or other written international agreement.
This conclusion is confirmed by explicit language in the opinion which
indicates that the holding derives from the perceived lack of settled principles of
international law as to compensation in expropriation cases and not from any
notion that an act of state should defeat customary international law generally. As
noted above, Justice Harlan stated that the Court was not "reaffirming an

23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,§ 444 comment e.
24. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 428.
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inflexible or all-encompassing rule." In the same paragraph as the more often
quoted holding, the Court wrote:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning
a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an
25
agreed principle ....
Finally, while discussing the dispute between capitalist and Communist countries
as to international law regarding expropriation, the Court took care to include the
statement:
There are, of course, areas of international law in which consensus as to standards is
greater and which do not represent a battleground for conflicting ideologies. This
decision in no way intimates that the courts of this country are broadly foreclosed from
considering questions of international law.26
In addition, to apply the doctrine in all cases involving violations of customary
international law, but not when a "treaty or other unambiguous agreement" has
been violated, would make an irrational distinction between treaty law and
customary international law. Treaty law and customary international law are
equally binding forms of international law. 27 The two should be treated equally
in the Restatement.
A logical reading of Sabbatino thus would be that Justice Harlan would allow
the adjudication of claims that allege violation of treaties or settled customary
law,28 while applying the act of state doctrine to expropriation claims in those
29
cases where Harlan considered customary law principles to be unsettled.
Despite such a reading, the draft Restatement presented by the Reporters was
based on the view that "other unambiguous agreement" entirely excluded
customary international law. It took a motion from the floor, carried 70-40, to
overrule the Reporter and substitute the language of the Sabbatino opinion in
the relevant black letter provision. However, other portions of the Restatement
have not been rewritten to conform to the position adopted by the ALl in
overruling the Reporters on the black letter text of section 443. Rather
25. Id.
26. Id. at 430 n.34.

27. See F.A. MANN, STUDIES ININTERNATIONAL LAW 469-72 (1973) ("A legal duty imposed by
treaty is neither higher nor more effective than a duty arising under customary international law.").
See generally L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE §§ 16-18 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed.
1967).
28. At least one circuit seems to have adopted the view that a court must try to discern
"internationally-accepted legal principles" prior to involving the act of state doctrine. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1163 (1982), the Ninth Circuit sought, but was unable to find, an international consensus
"condemning cartels, royalties, and production agreements." Therefore, the claim was defeated by
the act of state.
29. Several commentators seem to endorse this approach. See R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL SociETY

409-13 (1970); R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION
VA. J. INT'L L. 601-03 (1978).

OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

77-78

(1978); Paust, Correspondence, 18
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than being presented in the proper Sabbatino context, suggesting deference to
settled international law, the ambiguous phrase is presented in the context of
Restatement language emphasizing the preclusive scope of the act of state
doctrine.
In sum, Sabbatino should be read narrowly, precluding adjudication on the
merits only of expropriations and only where agreed principles of international
law are absent. In other types of cases, courts should apply international law, if
agreed principles exist. Therefore, in my view, section 443 of the Restatement,
which applies the preclusive act of state doctrine to "other acts of a governmental character" and which suggests a general preemption of customary international law, is unjustified by a proper reading of Sabbatino.
D.

"GOVERNMENTAL"

AcTs

The act of state doctrine only bars adjudication of the "public" or "governmental" acts of a foreign sovereign. 30 The lower courts have expended
considerable, though largely unsuccessful, efforts attempting to define which
foreign sovereign's acts are "public" or "governmental" for purposes of the
doctrine. 3 1 Unfortunately, the Restatement fails to supply a coherent classification of the types of acts to which the doctrine applies.
The black letter section of the Restatement recognizes that the act of state
doctrine only applies to expropriations and "other acts of a governmental
character." 32 Comment c to section 443 develops a "test" to determine whether
the doctrine applies:
[W]hether a particular act of a foreign state not involving expropriation comes under
the act of state doctrine depends on the extent to which adjudication of the challenge
would require the United States court to consider the
33 propriety of the acts and policies,
or probe the motives, of the foreign government.
However, the application of this test has resulted in the anomalous Restatement
position advocating a "human rights" exception to the doctrine while leaving
ambiguous a commercial activity exception.
1. Human Rights
It is when they reach the area of human rights that the Restaters seem to realize
the implications of having succumbed so totally (and unjustifiably) to the charms
30. This basic premise has been recognized consistently by the Supreme Court in act of state
cases; "[dlistinguishing between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one
hand and their private and commercial acts on the other is not a novel approach." Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976).
31. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer,
S.A., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th
Cir. 1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 443.
33. Id. comment c.
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of Underhill's grandiose language, without stopping to count the cost to
international law. Despite the Restatement's restrictive treatment of a general
customary international law exception, it does present a new, and unprecedented,
"human rights" exception to the act of state doctrine. The Restatement suggests,
in Comment c to section 443, that:
[a] claim arising out of an alleged violation of human rights . would . probably
not be defeated by the act of state defense, since the accepted international law of
human rights is both well established and contemplates external scrutiny of such acts.
The Restatement provision raises at least three problems. First, the law of
human rights is not, in fact, more well established than other areas of customary
international law; nor does the law of human rights contemplate external scrutiny
any more than do other areas of international law. 34 Protection of individual
rights of nonaliens, i.e., materials of the offending state, under international law
has become generally accepted only relatively recently and by no means
universally. 35 On the other hand, the international law governing protection of
an alien's property is much older,36
Second, the Restatement does not provide, in this section or in other sections
explicitly addressing human rights, convincing reasons for distinguishing some
human rights from other individual rights, such as property rights. 37 Philosophers and political scientists have long argued that protecting individual property
rights is an essential prerequisite to continued protection of individual civil and
human rights.38 The right to own and not be arbitrarily deprived of property is
explicitly protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 39 which the
United States Government as well as most specialists in human rights law regard
as declaratory of customary international law. In addition, several ALl members
recently argued that property rights should be protected40 as fundamental rights
under the customary international law of human rights.
This author does not believe that a human rights exception to the act of state
doctrine is improper. However, the justifications marshalled in favor of the
34. See generally Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
35. Id. at 9 ("[A] state's own citizens were almost completely at its mercy, and international law
had little to say about mistreatment of persons by their own government.") In fact, in section 702 of
the Restatement, in Reporters' Note 13, the reporters admit " [t]he customary law of human rights has
developed largely since the previous Restatement."
36. See, e.g., West Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, 2 Eng. Rep. 391 (K.B. 1905);
U.S. Dep't of State, 19 Press Releases 50, 136, 139, 165 (1938) (United States-Mexico discussions
on expropriations). See generally 2 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 900-29, 1385-413
(1937).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 701 reporter's note 6, § 702 comment k.
38. Primary among these political philosophers was John Locke. Locke writes: "The Reason
why Men enter into Society, is the preservation of their Property." Second Treatise of Government

§ 222. See generally J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES

OF GOVERNMENT

(P. Laslett ed. 3d ed. 1698).

39. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).

40. ALl

PROCEEDINGS,supra

note 7, at 216-21.
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6xception apply with equal vigor to many other violations of customary
international law. Indeed, it would be unfortunate to rest the protection of
human rights on the thin reed of a bare and not altogether convincing assertion
in the Restatement rather than on the firmer foundation of adjudicable
international law. Therefore, the human rights exception should not stand alone,
but should be part of a broader exception for all violations of customary
international law.
2. CommercialActivities
In contrast to the area of human rights, where the drafters posit an exemption
from the act of state doctrine which sadly is not well supported in law, the
Restatement (Third) takes an ambiguous position on the exemption of claims
arising from the commercial activities of a foreign government, for which there
is significant authority. Comment c of the Restatement section 443, immediately
after advocating the human rights exception, states:
Whether, as suggested by four Justices in Dunhill, . . . the act of state doctrine is
inapplicable to commercial acts of foreign states, such as ordinary breaches of contract
or warranty of product or title, has not yet been decided.
The Restatement's ambiguity with respect to the commercial exception is
inconsistent with its rationale for a human rights exception. 4 ' Indeed, most facets
of international commercial law truly are well established and do contemplate
external scrutiny.
The commercial exception to the act of state doctrine also is supported by a
Supreme Court plurality opinion, the purposes of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act, certain lower court opinions, the State Department, and scholarly
commentary. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba four Justices
announced, "the concept of an act of state should not be extended to include
repudiation of a purely commercial obligation."a 2 The plurality opinion primarily based its view on two factors. First, the Court recognized that by codifying
the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, Congress intended to exclude
commercial activities from the scope of immunity. 4 3 Second, subjecting sovereigns to established international commercial rules is unlikely "to touch very
41. As the Supreme Court noted in Dunhill, "discernible rules of international law have emerged
with regard to the commercial dealings of private parties in the international market." Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976). In support of the statement, the

Court cited, inter alia, A. LOWENFELD,

INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE

(1975); Gal, The Commercial

Law ofNations and the Law ofInternationalTrade, 6 CORNELL lrr'L L.J. 55, 64 (1972); Schmitthoff,
The Unification or Harmonisationof Law by Means of StandardContracts and General Conditions,
17 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 551, 563-64 (1968).
42. 425 U.S. at 695.
43. id. at 698-99. The court reasoned: "Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent
with this restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act of state; for if it were,
foreign governments, by merely repudiating the debt .. . would enjoy an immunity which our
Government would not extend them under prevailing sovereign immunity principles ..... Id.
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sharply on 'national nerves,' " because international consensus exists with
regard to commercial dealings. 44 The latter rationale suggests that the commercial activity exception can be viewed as one specific manifestation of a general
exception for agreed principles of customary international law.
Since the Dunhill decision, at least two circuits have expressed support for the
commercial exception, 4 as have several district courts.46 Although at least one
court has rejected the exception 47 and others have avoided the question,a4 several
commentators believe the commercial activity exception "appears to stand on
the verge of becoming a well-entrenched boundary for the act of state doctrine.
It is apparently only a matter of time49until the [exception] is universally declared
a rule of law in American courts."
The Restatement's vague treatment of the incipient commercial activity
exception to the act of state doctrine understates the weight of authority
supporting that exception. Instead of reflecting authoritative law, the Restatement
appears to demonstrate a desire to expand the act of state doctrine, even at the
expense of international law. Therefore, in this author's view, the Restatement
again fails accurately to reflect the law.
In sum, the Restatement (Third) drafters have selected language and cases that
give the act of state doctrine an unduly expansive interpretation. In some areas,
the Restatement goes against governing authority, restating what the Court never
stated or even what it rejected. In others, the Restatement's treatment does not
reflect the weight of authority. The effect has been to present the act of state
doctrine as broader in scope, more general in application, more preclusive of

44. Id. at 704.
45. The Second Circuit, in dicta in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., observed "Dunhill declined to
extend the act of state doctrine to situations where the sovereign has descended to the level of an
entrepreneur." 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). The Ninth Circuit, in
a footnote in Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., wrote, "purely commercial activity
ordinarily does not require judicial forbearance under the act of state doctrine." 705 F.2d 1030, 1048
n.25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
46. American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C.
1980); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
National Am. Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D.
Del. 1976), aff'd mem., 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
47. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
48. Calejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1115 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer,
S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
49. Rehabilitation and Exoneration, supra note 5, at 637; see also Fredman & Blau,
Formulatinga Commercial Exception to the Act of State Doctrine; Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 666, 681 (1976). But see McCormick, The Commercial
Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 16 L. & POLY IN
Irr'L Bus. 477, 511-14 (1984); Note, International Association of Machinists v. OPEC; The Ninth
Circuit Breathes New Life into the Act of State Doctrine in Commercial Settings, 16 GEO. WASH. J.
INr'L L. & ECON. 427 (1982).
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international law, and less susceptible of limitation than is warranted by
governing authority.
III. The Act of State Doctrine: Existing Problems
The Restatement's expansive view of the act of state doctrine would aggravate
several problems that result from application of the doctrine. It goes almost
without saying that application of the doctrine to a wide range of cases is likely
to inhibit the development of international law in the United States and the
enforcement of international law abroad. United States courts that use the
doctrine to enforce foreign decrees that violate international law run the risk of
violating the due process and taking without compensation rights of the
individual litigators. Moreover, expansion of the act of state doctrine impairs the
effectiveness of other U.S. laws. Therefore, to the extent the Restatement reflects
an unduly expansive view of the doctrine, it would exacerbate serious problems
with the doctrine.

A.

DUE PROCESS AND TAKING WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION

A major problem that accompanies the act of state doctrine is the failure to
protect fully the rights of the particular litigants. By precluding adjudication on
the merits, the act of state doctrine works to deny citizens their day in court. It
cuts against the courts' fundamental goals of upholding the law and doing justice
to those who properly invoke the protection of the courts.
The act of state doctrine also raises constitutional issues. A recent article by
Professor Halberstam persuasively argues that enforcement in a U.S. court of a
foreign confiscation that violates international law may violate the due process
and taking without just compensation clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 5 ° Professor Halberstam points out that, according to the Supreme
Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,5 1 court enforcement of private action
constitutes state action. 52 It is clear that the United States Congress could not
constitutionally nationalize property without providing adequate compensation.
Therefore, United States court enforcement of a foreign confiscation of U.S.
property in violation of international law might be state action and itself
constitute a constitutional violation. 3
50. Halberstam, supra note 5, at 83-85.
51. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52. Halberstam, supra note 5, at 83.
53. Id. at 83-84. Alternatively, Professor Halberstam argues:
[S]ince the purpose of the act of state doctrine is to further the foreign policy interests
of the United States, its application in situations where an individual is compelled to
relinquish his private property towards that end, without compensation, violates the
"taking without just compensation" clause, particularly where the lawful owner
succeeds in obtaining possession of the illegally confiscated property . . . and he is
compelled by a judgment of a U.S. court to return it.
Id. at 84.
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DEVELOPMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Another major problem created by the act of state doctrine is that it precludes
U.S. courts from participating in the development and clarification of international law in a large category of cases. 54 From the onset of our national history,
U.S. courts, following Blackstone, have treated international law as part of our
domestic law. United States and other domestic courts have played a major role
in promoting and defining international law. 56 Until international judicial
institutions gain sufficient respect and acceptance of their jurisdiction, municipal
courts will continue to be the major source of international law enforcement. 57
The act of state doctrine unnecessarily removes U.S. courts from this
important arena. Municipal courts are forced to abdicate their role in interpreting
important categories of cases. In the long run, this judicial
abstention will be
58
detrimental to both international law and U.S. interests.
C.

EFFECTIVENESS OF OTHER U.S. LAWS

59

The act of state doctrine, particularly in the expansive application advocated
by the Restatement (Third), also acts to thwart U.S. statutory law.
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, Congress codified the so-called restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 6 ° One
primary goal of the FSIA was to mandate adjudication of a foreign sovereign's
54. Several commentaries have discussed how the act of state doctrine precludes the development of international law. This author dealt with the topic in Leigh & Sandier, Dunhill: Toward a
Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685 (1976). Other discussions of this issue include
Bazyler, supra note 5, at 381-84; Halberstam, supra note 5; Wallace, Abolishing or Changing the Act
of State Doctrine by Legislation: Comments, in ACT OFSTATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 25 (J.
Lacey ed. 1983).
55. One of the strongest statements that international law is part of U.S. law is found in Hilton
v. Guyot: "International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense ... is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented
in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their determination." 159 U.S. 113, 163
(1895). Older expressions are found in Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808), and The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
56. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964);
Friedmann, National Courts and the International Legal Order: Projections on the Implicationsof the
Sabbatino Case, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443 (1966); Leigh & Atkeson, Due Process in the Emerging
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 21 Bus. LAW. 853, 866-67 (1966).
57. See, e.g., J. GAMBLE, JR. & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS
OFA FAILURE 1-5, 11-27 (1976); J. HALDERMAN, THE UNITED NATIONALS ANDTHE RULE OFLAW (1966).
58. Leigh & Atkeson, supra note 56, at 865-66. A related consequence of an expanded act of
state doctrine is the reduced enforcement of the international law of expropriation in foreign courts.
Foreign courts are unlikely to apply vigilantly the "prompt, adequate and effective" standard of
compensation to U.S. goods that had been nationalized by a third country, when U.S. courts would
find the issue nonjusticiable. Therefore, removal of U.S. courts from the international arena is
detrimental to international law and U.S. business interests.
59. See generally Bazyler, supra note 5, at 376-81.
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1982).
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commercial activity based on the nature of the acts, even when the sovereign asserted
a "public purpose" for them. 6' However, courts, eager to avoid deciding these
difficult cases, granted jurisdiction as mandated by the FSIA, but invoked the act of
state doctrine to avoid a decision on the merits. 62 Under an act of state analysis
some
63
courts have reverted to examining the purpose behind the sovereign's acts.
This type of examination narrows the category of acts which will be considered
"commercial," since almost any act of a foreign sovereign has some "public
purpose." 64 Based on a "purpose" analysis, several courts have explicitly
avoided deciding whether a commercial act exception exists by categorizing the
sovereign's acts as "public" and not commercial. 65 Thus, these courts have
circumvented the FSIA. 66 The Restatement's ambiguous treatment of the commercial exception undermines one of the explicit purposes of the FSIA.
2. Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct

67

In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which
proscribes corporate payments to foreign officials for the purpose of inducing
preferential business treatment. 68 The FCPA reflects the view that international
70
69
bribery is detrimental to domestic business concerns and U.S. foreign policy.
However, corporate defendants have been able to shield themselves from liability

61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982), and H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6615 [hereinafter FSIA HOUSE REPORT].

62. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer,
762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
63. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1115-16; Braka, 762 F.2d 225; International Ass'n of Machinists, 649
F.2d at 1360.
64. See generally Bazyler, supra note 5, at 367-68, in which the author notes that the issuance
of a license for the capture and export of rhesus monkeys was found to have a sovereign purpose.
MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d
1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
65. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1115-16; Braka, 762 F.2d at 225; Clayco Petroleum Corp. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404,408 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
66. In addition, the FSIA sought to eliminate the executive role in making immunity decisions,
FSIA HousE REPORT, supra note 61, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6605-06, thus

removing the executive from the act of state calculus. Nonetheless, in practice, lower courts give
dispositive effect to execute determinations. (Most recently the Second Circuit deferred to a
"Bernstein" letter in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 822 F.2d 230, 236
(2d Cir. 1987.)) Thus, two areas of congressional intent have been ignored.
67. See generally Note, Foreign Corrupt Practices: Creating an Exception to the Act of State
Doctrine, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 203 (1984) [hereinafter Foreign Corrupt Practices].
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m.-78dd-1, 78ff (1982).
69. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977). Bribery causes the public to lose
confidence in the free market system by directing business to those companies that are too inefficient
to compete. Id. Bribery puts pressure on honest businesses to lower their ethical standards or risk
losing business.
70. Congress noted the worldwide disdain for bribery. Id. Bribery may undermine foreign policy
because developing countries will be afraid that American businesses will have a corrupting influence
on their political leaders. S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
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under the FCPA by involving a foreign sovereign and invoking the act of state
doctrine. 7' The Restatement does not address the possibility of an FCPA
exception to the act of state doctrine.
At least one federal district court has endorsed an FCPA exception to the
doctrine, 72 while another seems to preclude application of the act of state
doctrine in all cases alleging corruption and fraud. 73 Proponents of a corruption
exception assert that the FCPA demonstrates not only the intent to halt
international bribery but also the view that U.S. courts should adjudicate claims
involving such practices. 74 Nonetheless, certain courts have refused to
consider 75 or have rejected a corruption exception.76 In order to enforce the
FCPA, the Restatement should have at least mentioned the possibility of an FCPA
exception to the doctrine.7 7
IV. Origins and Rationales of the Doctrine:
Sources of Problems and Solutions
Perhaps in recognition of the problems flowing from Sabbatino even when
narrowly construed, the Supreme Court has never seemed comfortable with that
71. See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
72. Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 909-10 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
73. Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf& Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680,690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
74. Sage Int'l, 534 F. Supp. at 909-10; see also Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of
Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1247, 1261 (1977).
75. Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 984 (1977).
76. Clayco Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d at 408-09.
77. Federal antitrust laws also are adversely affected by the act of state doctrine. Too often in
antitrust actions, potential defendants have immunized themselves from liability by involving a
foreign sovereign collaterally in their schemes and invoking the act of state doctrine to preclude
adjudication. The result is judicial abstention, based on act of state, in cases in which the connection
between the foreign sovereign's act and the issues creating the cause of action is quite attenuated.
See, e.g., Clayco, 712 F.2d 404; Hunt, 550 F.2d 68; Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas &
Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'dper curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972). Thus, the intended extraterritorial scope of U.S. antitrust laws is foiled.
Compare, however, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, which cautioned -[i]t is apparent that the
doctrine does not bestow a blank-check immunity upon all conduct blessed with some imprimatur of
a foreign government." Timberlane Lane Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th
Cir. 1976). The Restatement does little to limit this abuse of the act of state doctrine. The Restatement
did not discuss antitrust cases in either the black letter or the comments. In Reporters' Note 7, the
Restatement provides an annotation-like listing of antitrust cases, but does not suggest a resolution
to the confusion or a limit to the doctrine. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 443 reporters' note
7. Meanwhile, several critics have sought to limit abusive application of the doctrine. Bazyler, supra
note 5, at 378-79. Rehabilitationand Exoneration, supra note 5, at 637-45. In addition, there are
many cases giving proper effect to antitrust laws in the face of act of state challenges. E.g.,
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Timberlane,
549 F.2d 597. Therefore, the Restatement should have placed greater emphasis on these interpretations limiting the applications of the act of state doctrine in antitrust actions.
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decision. During consideration of Dunhill, the Court requested counsel to brief
the question "Should this Court's holding in . . . Sabbatino . .. be
reconsidered?" 78 While the Court did not reach that question in Dunhill, it
recently granted certiorari with respect to the act of state doctrine in the case of
Environmental Tectronics Corp., Int'l v. W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. 79 This case
deals with the question of whether the allegation of bribery of a foreign official
calls for the application of the act of state doctrine. While the Court may limit
itself to resolving a conflict between circuits as to whether the motivations of a
foreign governmental act may be examined by U.S. courts, it also may have the
opportunity to return the act of state doctrine unequivocally to a traditional and
better-reasoned legal foundation, that of conflict of laws.
The Restatement, like many modem cases 8° and commentaries, 8 1 traces the
origin of the act of state doctrine to the Supreme Court's decision in Underhill
v. Hernandez.8 2 In Underhill the Court wrote, in dicta, 83 what has been called
the "classic" statement of the doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign

State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory.84
According to the Restatement, the Supreme Court was "building on Underhill"
when in Sabbatino it held that "the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity
of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government." 85 Thus, the Restatement overemphasizes the concept of "territoriality" in the development of the doctrine.86 This narrow analysis of the origins
of the doctrine has led the Restatement (and many courts) to expand the doctrine
beyond its logical and historical dimensions at the expense of international law,
the rights of the litigants, and the effectiveness of other U.S. laws.
From these stated origins, the Restatement suggests a veritable potpourri of
rationales justifying the act of state doctrine. Comment a to section 443
mentions, among others, avoiding "disrespect for foreign states"; concerns with
"the competence and function" of the Judicial and Executive Branches; and
78. 422 U.S. at 1005.
79. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3213 (U.S. June 26, 1989) (No.
87-2066). On January 17, 1990, after this article was submitted to the printer, the Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the Third Circuit in an opinion which somewhat narrows the application of the
doctrine.
80. E.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416; Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military
Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 1984); Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406.
81. E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices, supra note 67, at 207; McCormick, supra note 49, at 493.
82. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
83. The background of the Underhill decision is comprehensively discussed in Rehabilitation and
Exoneration, supra note 5, at 601-04. The author shows that the "classic statement" is only dictum.
84. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
85.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note I, § 443 comment a.

86. The courts' overemphasis of "territoriality" was discussed in Leigh & Sandler, supra note
54, at 702-09.
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"deference to the Executive Branch. ' 87 Finally, almost as an afterthought, in
Reporters' Note 1 to section 443, the Restatement acknowledges
that the doctrine
"may be seen as a special rule of conflict of laws." 88
By commencing a study of the act of state doctrine with Underhill, courts,
commentators, and the Restatement fail to recognize a principle that antedates
and limits the act of state doctrine: the incorporation of the rules of the "law of
nations" into U.S. municipal law. 89 According to this doctrine, the validity of a
governmental act of another country depends on its consistency with international law because international law is part of U.S. domestic law. 90 In several
pre-Underhill cases, the Supreme Court resolved conflicts between the "law of
nations" and the act of state. 91 In each case, the "law of nations" prevailed. In
Rose v. Himely 92 Chief Justice John Marshall held, as long ago as 1808, that
U.S. courts were required to examine the validity of a foreign court's action
under the law of nations; the Court decided that the French condemnation of a
ship was null and invalid because the French court lacked jurisdiction under the
law of nations. In fact, in Underhill, the source of the expansive act of state
interpretation, there was no claim that the acts of state violated international
law. 93 Rose v. Himely has never been questioned and never overruled. Be it also
noted that it is not cited in the Restatement.
A proper resolution of most of these difficulties may be found by understanding the act of state doctrine as an application of traditional conflict of laws
analysis. 94 Under such an analysis, events that occur entirely within a foreign
state will generally be evaluated pursuant to the legal rules of decision of the
foreign state. 95 However, a second choice of law rule prohibits enforcement
of
96
the foreign law (or act) if it violates the public policy of the forum.
A foreign sovereign's acts that violate a treaty or universally accepted
principle of customary law (or presumably a U.S. law with extraterritorial reach,
i.e., FSIA and FCPA) would violate U.S. public policy and the acts would be
subject to the relevant treaty or international law principle. In such a situation,
the act of state doctrine would not apply. If the sovereign's acts were not clearly
in violation of a treaty or agreed principle of customary international law, then
the decision whether to apply the act of state doctrine would depend on a
weighing of interests. Certain courts have interpreted Sabbatino as suggesting

87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 443 comment a.

88. Id. Reporters' Note 1.
89. See generally Leigh & Sandler, supra note 54, at 702-09.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 702.
See cases discussed in Leigh & Sandier, supra note 54.
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 240 (1808).
Leigh & Sandler, supra note 54, at 705.

94. Id. at 709-18.
95.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§

158 (1971).

96. Id. § 117.
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this type of "balancing test." 97 The test would incorporate a number of factors
suggested by the various rationales commonly advanced for the doctrine: the
"degree of codification or consensus concerning . . . international law," the

extent to which adjudication would touch on the "national nerves" of the foreign
state, the extent to which adjudication would hinder our foreign policy
objectives, and the need to defer to the executive branch. The presumption would
be, however, that international law, and not the foreign state's municipal law,
provides the appropriate rule of decision.
Application of the doctrine in this manner would go a long way toward solving
the problems discussed above. United States courts would be able to adjudicate
international law claims. Courts would examine the merits of the individual
litigants' case, providing them adequate due process protection. Finally, U.S.
laws with extraterritorial scope would be given effect, unless such action would
violate public policy.
V. Conclusion
The confusion and controversy surrounding the act of state doctrine have
encouraged at least two scholars to recommend the doctrine's complete
abolition. 98 Although abolition is an extreme alternative, few would disagree that
the doctrine needs to be properly defined and limited.
The Restaters have done little to clarify the most confused areas of the
doctrine. Nor have they limited the doctrine to the confines suggested by Harlan
twenty-five years ago. Rather, they have given renewed vigor to an overblown
doctrine and expanded it at the expense of international law. Their view, if
followed, is sure to exacerbate the problems created by the doctrine. A solution
to the difficulties inherent in the act of state doctrine can be most easily achieved
by returning to the conflict of laws roots of the doctrine. The choice of laws
rationale advocated in this article would reimpose the logical and historical
boundaries that properly define the act of state doctrine and assure that it would
not be used to defeat international law, or the due process rights of individuals,
or the intended effects of U.S. statutory enactments.

97. E.g., Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 325-26 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage
Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 90-06 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
98. Bazyler, supra note 5, at 396-98; International Rule of Law Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1981)
(statement of D. Wallace, Jr.: "I would be prepared to support a bill that abolished the act of state
doctrine in its entirety").
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